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opinion, the Court explained, did not
be presumed that defamatory speech
involve a media defendant. Id. (citing
exist.Id.
was false, as under common law. MoreHepps, 475 U.S. at 772).
The Court explained, however, that
over, the burden of showing falsity and
Turning to the facts of the instant
the affirmative defense known as "fair
fault was on the allegedly defamed plaincase, the Court found that the language
comment" was incorporat<;:d into comtiff and not on the media defendant who
used in the article about Milkovich was
mon law, applying only to expressions of
previously was required to prove truth.
not "loose, figurative or hyperbolic lanopinion. This principle, "afford[ed] legal
Id. (citing Philadelphia Newspapers,
guage." Id Additionally, the Court stated
immunity for the honest expression of
Inc.v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776(1986».
that neither the language, nor the general
opinion on matters of legitimate public
tenor of the article, negated the impresThe Court then noted its recognition
interest when based upon a true or privision that the author seriously maintained
of constitutional limitations on the type
leged statement of fact." Id. at 2703
that Milkovich committed the crime of
of speech which could serve as a basis
(quoting 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of
perjury. Id.
for a defamation action. Id ConstituTorts § 5.28 (1956». The Court found
The Court noted that the truth could
tionallyprotected speech, not subject to
that the purpose of "fair comment" was
be ascertained by comparing, inter alia,
defamation law included "loose figurato balance free and uninhibited discustive speech," "merely rhetorical hyperMilkovich's testimony at the OHSAA
sion of public issues with the need to
bole," as well as, "lusty and imaginative
hearing with his subsequent testimony
redress injury to reputation caused by
expression of contempt." Id. at 2705
in trial court. Therefore, the connotainvidious irresponsible speech. Id.
(quoting Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
tion that Milkovich committed perjury
To further protect freedom of speech,
U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974».
was an articulation of an objectively
Milkovich, attempted to persuade the
freedom of the press and uninhibited
verifiable event. Id. Consequently, the
Court to recognize an additional protecdebate, the Court explained, it began to
Court remanded the case for a determition for statements characterized as
require public officials to prove defamanation of whether or not the statements
opinions as opposed to fact. He relied on
tory statements were made with 'actual
were false.
dictum from Gertz which basically reitmalice.' Id. (citing New York Times Co.
In reaching its conclusion, the SueratedJustice Holmes' "marketplace of
v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964». The
preme Court managed to intricately balideas" concept. Id. Yet the argument,
New York Times 'actual malice' test was
ance first amendment values. Namely, it
equating "opinion" with "idea," was relater extended to public figures, defined
balanced the vital guarantee of freedom
jected by the Court, which stated that
as those persons "intimately involved in
of speech as it relates to the press and
the passage relied upon from Gertz was
the resolution of important public questhe uninhibited discussion of public
not "intended to create a wholesale deftions or, by reason of their fame, shape
issues against the pervasively strong inamation exception for anything that
events in areas of concern to society at
terest of preventing reputations from
might be labeled 'opinion.'" Id.
large." Id. (quoting Curtis Publishing
being falsely dishonored. Thus, the
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967». The
The Court noted that expressions of
Court, in a unanimous decision, opted
required standard of prooffor both pubopinion may often imply an assertion of
not to provide even more protection to
lic officials and public figures, the Court
objective facts. Id. For example, the
media defendants by failing to recognize
noted, was clear and convincing evistatement "[i]n my opinion Jones is a
an opinion exception to state defamadence.Id. at 2703-04 (citing Gertz, 418
liar," the court believed could cause as
tion laws.
U.S. at 342).
much damage to one's reputation as the
- Kimberly A. Doyle
statement, "Jones is a liar." Id. at 2706.
The distinction between public and
"[It] would be destructive of the law of
private individuals, the Court reasoned,
libel if a writer could escape liability for
was predicated not only on the fact that
accusationsof[ defumatoryconduct ] simply
Illinois v. Perkins: UNDERCOVER
public persons voluntarily exposed themby using, explicitly or implicitly, the
AGENTS NEED NOT GIVE
selves to the increased risk of defamawords 'I think.'" Id. (quoting Cianci v.
tion, but also had greater opportunity to
MIRANDA WARNINGS TO
New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54,
INCARCERATED SUSPECTS
counteract any false statements through
64 (2d Cir. 1980».
BEFORE ASKING QUESTIONS
effective communication channels. Id
at 2704 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344WHICH MAY EliCIT
The Court stated that public figures
45). However, the Court did not extend
INCRIMINATING RESPONSES
and officials must show that defamatory
the 'actual malice' standard to private
In Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394
statements were made with knowledge
persons concerning matters of public
( 1990), the Supreme Court held that
of their falsity or with reckless disregard
of the truth. Id. at 2707. Alternatively,
interest. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v.
the fifth amendment does not require
statements involving private individuals
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 ( 1971 ) ).
undercover government agents posing
on matters of public concern place the
The Court discussed further limitaas inmates to give Miranda warnings to
incarcerated suspects before asking
tions placed on the damages recoveraburden on the plaintiff to show that the
questions that may elicit incriminating
ble in libel actions. First, liability could
false connotations were made with some
responses. The Court found that no
not be imposed without some showing
level of fault as required by Gertz. Id
coercive atmosphere exists when an
of fault. Id. Second, punitive damages
Thus, on matters of public concern,
were not recoverable without a showincarcerated suspect voluntarily makes
statements must be provable as false
ing of 'actual malice.' Id Finally, the
incriminating statements to an officer
before liability can be imposed under
he assumes to be a fellow inmate.
Court had held that it could no longer
state defamation laws, at least when they
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 21.1/fheLawForum-37

In November 1984, Richard Stephenson was murdered in East St. Louis, Illinois. There were no suspects in the
homicide until March 1986, when Donald Charlton, an inmate of the Graham
Correctional Facility, informed the police that he had pertinent information
regarding the crime. A fellow inmate of
Charlton's, Uoyd Perkins, had told him
the details of a murder he committed in
East St. Louis.
Acting on Charlton's detailed account,
which the police found to be credible,
police traced Perkins to a jail in Montgomery County, Illinois, where he was
awaiting trial on an unrelated charge. In
order to further investigate Perkins' relation to the murder, police placed
undercover agent,John Parisi, and Charlton in a cellblock with Perkins. The two
men were instructed to engage Perkins
in casual conversation and report any
reference made to the Stephenson
murder. Parisi and Charlton gained Perkins' confidence by promising a fabricated escape plot. In that murder could
have been necessary to effectuate such a
plot, Parisi inquired whether Perkins
had ever murdered anyone before. Perkins responded by relaying the details of
how he murdered Stephenson. At no
time was Perkins given Miranda warnings, and Perkins was subsequently
charged with the Stephenson murder.
At trial, Perkins moved to suppress his
statements made to Parisi while in jail.
The trial court granted the motion; the
State appealed. In affirming, the appellate court held that Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), "prohibits all
undercover contacts with incarcerated
suspects which are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response." Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Miranda warnings must be
given under such circumstances, and
reversed.
In an opinion delivered by Justice
Kennedy, the Supreme Court first cited
the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, which prohibits the
admission into evidence of statements
made during custodial interrogation,
absent Miranda warnings. Custodial
interrogation involves the questioning
of a suspect in a coercive, policedominated atmosphere. [d. at 2397. The
Court found that the doctrine was in38-The Law Forum/21.1

tended to safeguard suspects from the
"inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will
to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so
freely." [d. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 467).
The Court, however, distinguished
Perkins from the concerns underlying
Miranda. The problem of compulsion
inherent in a police-dominated atmosphere, the Court reasoned, is not present when an incarcerated suspect speaks
voluntarily to an undercover
agent. "Coercion is determined from
the perspective of the suspect." [d. (citations omitted). Thus, the coercive
atmosphere is absent where a suspect
speaks voluntarily to a fellow inmate,
unaware that the inmate is a police
officer. [d.
Moreover, the Court rejected the state
court's assumption that whenever a suspect is in technical custody, Miranda
warnings must precede any conversation with an undercover agent. [d. The
Court reasoned that a suspect, unaware
that he is speaking with an undercover
agent, is neither motivated by pressure
nor the reaction he expects from his
listener. [d. at 2398. Miranda, the Court
stated, was not intended to protect statements motivated entirely by a suspect's
desire to impress other inmates. When
inmates boast to fellow inmates of their
crimes, they do so at their own risk. Only
when a suspect is under coercive pressure to do so, must Miranda warnings
be given. [d.
In addressing the ploy used to elicit
Perkins' statements, the Court found
that" strategic deception" did not rise to
the level of coercion and, was therefore
not violative of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. [d. (citations omitted). Relying
_primarily on HOffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 ( 1966), the Court reiterated its
approval of the use of deceptive tactics.
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398. In Hoffa,
incriminating statements made by the
petitioner to a police informant who
fooled him into believing that he was a
colleague, were held admissible, in that
they did not result from coercion. The
only factual distinction between the
cases, the Court noted, was that Perkins
was incarcerated, a fact the Court considered irrelevant. [d.
In addition, the Court distinguished

ated suspect made incriminating statements to an Internal Revenue Service
agent absent Miranda warnings. [d. In
Matbis, the suspect's statements were
found to be inadmissible. However, in
Matbis, the Court noted, the suspect
was fully aware that the agent was a
government official and was therefore
susceptible to coercive pressure to
answer questions. Perkins, on the other
hand, was unaware of the undercover
agent's official status. [d.
Finally, the Court rejected the respondent's argument that a bright-line
rule for applying Miranda was desirable.
[d. at 2389. The Court reasoned that law
enforcement officials would have no
problem implementing the holding that
undercover agents need not Mirandize
incarcerated suspects. [d. The holding
clearly stated that Miranda concerns
were not present in such cases, and
therefore, Miranda warnings were not
required under such circumstances.
Finding no Miranda concerns implicated when an undercover agent speaks
with an incarcerated suspect, the Court
held that Miranda warnings need not be
given. The Court found arguments
against the use of such deceptive techniques and in favor ofMiranda warnings
in all custodial situations to be unpersuasive. Thus, the use of undercover
agents to elicit incriminating information from suspects was ruled to be
a valid law-enforcement technique.
- Tena Touzos

Cruzan v. Missouri Department of
Health: MISSOURI MAY REQUIRE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF A PATIENT'S WISHES
TO DISCONTINUE FOOD AND
WATER
In Cruzan v. MissouriDep'tofHealtb,
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the Supreme
Court held that a state may apply a clear
and convincing evidence standard in
proceedings where a guardian seeks to
discontinue nutrition and hydration of a
person in a persistent vegetative state.
Thus, unless the patient expressed his
wishes sufficiently to meet
this standard before incompetency, he
would remain in a vegetative state indefinitely, regardless of the objections and
wishes of family members.

